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  1. Faculty Experts: Institute for Policy Research - Northwestern University
  2. Why Play in Teams?
  3. Introduction to Sociology/Print version

In stage one of translation, focal ac- nonhuman—that can participate in it. For these theorists, the social con- identify the actants human and nonhuman rel- sists of patterned networks of heterogeneous evant to its solution, and they make themselves materials Callon , p. These heterogeneous materials are gies. In stage two, focal actants work to dif- called actants, and according to ANT, actants fuse the issues, actants, and strategies just ar- Annu.

The independent entity that, at any time, can ac- network moves beyond acceptance and toward quire the ability to make things happen within enactment. When the process of translation is the actor-network. From that point forward, the action. It is the cert, from their results, from their connections initiation of the action-reaction chain that is and their functional positions in the network. This is because the doorbell, once it These ideas represent an important break rings, engages you; it requires you to answer with traditional ideas on social interaction— or ignore it, to make a decision and respond.

Animals, ob- human versus nonhuman. Rather, actants are jects, texts, cognitive images, etc. In ANT, mans. When scientists study the contents of actants can be human; they can be collectives a test tube or observe a cell through a mi- such as groups and organizations. But actants croscope, when writers link to the works pro- can also include nonhuman entities such as ani- duced by their predecessors, when manufactur- mals, objects, i.

In these scenarios, not All members— viewed as a legitimate participant in social human and nonhuman—can make things hap- interaction and hence an important subject pen Law As Latour , p. Then the two join together and Considering both positive addictions love of become one for a third actant, which they can music and negative addictions love of drugs , therefore move more easily.

But Like any radical theory, ANT has its crit- they treat the genetic test and resulting patents ics. Some are unable to accept the symmetry as actants as well. How- elements as legitimate interactants. Doing so ever, ANT proponents do not concede the increases the scope of the network we study point, arguing that nonhumans belong in our and enhances our understanding of interrela- analytic lens because a qualities such as inten- tional interests.

ANT propo- society including driving, parking, transport- nents oppose this idea as well, arguing that the ing, polluting, etc. From this perspec- tenets of ANT, the theory raises critical consid- tive, it does not matter if nonhumans actu- erations for the role of nonhumans in social in- ally possess the human capacities traditionally teraction. For social interaction to occur, human inter- Interactionist Theory and Nonhumans actants need only assume these potentials in Scholars who identify with the interactionist nonhumans.

But in re- ther with her concept of doing mind. She con- cent years, several researchers have challenged tends that social interaction between humans that position. The earliest challenges centered on the con- and forgetting. Some interactionists argued position that this [nonhuman] other exists and that humans can project mind onto nonhumans, acts independently of myself. If I recognize that seemingly endowing them with human capaci- the object is not other except in my own percep- ties. This process allows humans to legitimate tion, I am chasing my own tail.

I must take nonhumans as viable others in social interac- the role of the other that is actually and only tion. By projecting p. Sanders tion. First, she contends that nonhumans must dissected the projection process by observing appear capable of action that is independent of dog owners in veterinary clinics. He itemized direct human manipulation. Finally, humans must experience used by family members to project mental and a certain level of urgency, making their interac- social competence onto their severely retarded tion with nonhumans necessary to goal achieve- children.

Faculty Experts: Institute for Policy Research - Northwestern University

Cohen studies of the environment and environmental set the groundwork for such thinking, disasters. Here, elements of the environment outlining a process by which humans enter into are being analyzed as legitimate interactants. Accord- See, e. They also examine how humans and ani- interaction. But these intra- and interspecies interaction. Philoso- Annu. One self acts in the life space; the other more than cognitive images trapped in the soli- self interprets that action and responds. The re- tary mind. Rather, past and future entities, un- sult of the exchange has tangible consequences der certain circumstances, may indeed play a for concrete micro- and macroeconomic sys- role in social interaction.

Social psychologists, tems. These scholars speak quite boldly of such economists, and sociologists explore such ideas interactions as a war of sorts in which the in writings on time perspective. What makes present self must battle the future self for mas- these works important is their underlying im- tery. Schelling , pp. Indeed, Loewenstein Lewin , , Life space also in- a theory of agency.

For example, those present, and future to a musical chord. There, past and future present, and future selves. Mische , continues to de- who can envision the future self and perceive velop these ideas, setting an explicit agenda for interactions between present and future selves the study of projectivity, an exploration of the are more likely to refrain from further substance relationship between present- and future-based abuse than those in any other condition—i.

Among homeless individuals, those who et al. Research also regularly engaged with one another in social shows that those who can envision the future interaction.


  • Introduction to Sociology/Print version.
  • Have we seen the geneticisation of society? Expectations and evidence?
  • Have we seen the geneticisation of society? Expectations and evidence.
  • Grim (Tornians Book 1)!
  • (PDF) Nonhumans in Social Interaction | Karen Cerulo - uvimalimawer.gq!
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  • Sports Teams as Organizational Laboratories;

In haviors than those in any other condition. He also imagine these selves to be capable of social found the particular self with whom his subjects interaction. The works to follow Avatar: computerized access the thoughts and feelings of their past move beyond human and nonhuman mergers. For a related sociological perspective, see techno-objects have had notable effects on peo- Denzin As a result, nonhuman objects become When it comes to bringing nonhumans into an active part of social interaction as opposed the study of social interaction, scholars of tech- to mere props used by humans to enhance or nological change have been especially active.

Others have focused on the power of new interaction. Now, tial boundaries of social interaction, allowing the experiments tested person-to-computer, imagined entities to enter into social exchange. Results showed Such works move far beyond previous ideas that people—even the most technologically on the relationship between humans and tech- sophisticated people—interacted with these nology. In the past, social theorists were most entities just as they interacted with humans. Years later, Haraway , wrote ; Tzeng Subjects liked computers, of the cyborg society, arguing that the relation- robots, and avatars with personalities or social ship between people and technology had be- characteristics similar to their own Al-Natour come so close, so intimate, that it was no longer et al.

They trusted comput- machines began. They found masculine-sounding in which these objects change both how our computers, robots, and avatars extroverted, bodies look as well as what we can or cannot driven, and intelligent, whereas they judged www. See also Bernstein Technosynchronicity: a new form of They even altered their body posture et al. In essence, new technologies just one way to involve nonhumans in social memories or future endowed these objects with critical interactive interaction.

There are other means by which imaginings are recreated and engaged and communicative capacities, encouraging nonhumans can be brought into this venue. In so doing, these technolo- , Holtgraves et al. Rather, these technologies make it those that met her criteria. She produce it in the empirical world of shared, found that subjects responded to the robots in sensory experience. In this way, persons, ob- unmistakably social ways.

And in a publicly accessible space. Using a special apparatus, one can , ; Turkle Turkle contends that, like humans, actually sense the location and interact within it these nonhuman entities actively engage hu- before it achieves material existence. Surveys show that ral planes. As such, view their pets as fully interacting members of the young cells live out their life in the con- the family. Pets are Annu.

Data on spending show that pur- inclusion of nonhumans in social interaction. Those dollars went beyond caretaking ships worldwide. Social scientists of earlier eras factors such as food, water, medical care, or showed little interest in broadly surveying peo- supervision. But in the past quarter century, i. Social scientists are insurance, spa days, playgroups, designer pet now asking questions about how individuals en- homes, vacations, and pet translators APPA vision and interpret nonhumans in interactive Americans believe that deities, saints, and an- gels are among us performing miracles.

Americans, for example, re- These data do not indicate a new trend. With regard As with deities, these beliefs are not neces- to deities, for example, recent studies show sarily new, but studying them via surveys is new. For example, an interactive exchange between two socially data from the Changing Lives of Older Cou- situated entities, albeit with one who is nei- ples study, a Detroit-based study of spousal be- ther copresent nor human. The data also show that those reporting Annu. Those inter- Stark ; Wuthnow , , These individuals dictate their prayer partners. See also Bonanno et al.

For example, high-power executives choose , ; Carr et al. Popenoe contrasts the tities such as Jesus or the saints. Individuals role of deceased parents to that of parents also pray to those that they believe command absent owing to divorce or desertion. He the resources best adapted to the task at hand.

When reference to situational or thematic concerns— a father dies, his favorable reputation is still e. As a result, Jesus, the saints, etc. Finally, individuals pre- children of deceased fathers tend to have higher fer to pray to entities with whom they per- self-esteem and fewer behavioral problems than ceive a long-term relationship—cointeractants children who lose fathers via divorce or aban- who provide the supplicant with a sense of donment.

The Dead One-third of Americans believe that ghosts and spirits inhabit the earth. Some estimates suggest that intention, inquiries. Thus, nonhumans deserve avatar communities, treating them as cultural cognition that involves a more central place in our analytic frame. To- scripted, routine, or worlds akin to those studied by Malinowski, ward that end, I propose three suggestions that habitual responses Meade, or Goffman. These studies document might better integrate nonhumans in social in- the norms, practices, and values that guide teraction studies.

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They also in social interaction. But in terms mental motivations. This is problematic for some. But perhaps we need not completely divorce Yee spent three years surveying ourselves from considerations of mind. We can 30, users of massively multiuser online role- just as effectively draw nonhumans into our an- playing games MMORPGs. His data tell us alytic frame by distinguishing the states of mind much about how individuals perceive their that can accompany social interaction.

But social interaction may also result maintained with copresent humans.

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Indeed, al- from automatic cognition—i. But regardless of its trigger, many mirrored patterns found in human-to-human interactions are the products of processes that relationships. For example, www. In so doing, pets action. Recall his exclusion of habituating hu- can establish a cognitive, affective, and behav- mans, fatigued, sleeping, comatose humans, and ioral presence in interaction, one that devel- humans in the grips of euphoria.

When my dog sees me cry and comes tween senior citizens and robots, Turkle et al. Seniors who had lost ties with their friends in meaningful social interaction—even though or family members were most likely to engage we have different mental orientations to the robots in social interaction. Similar patterns exchange. Now suggests that mental images—entities that re- consider factors such as the gender of interac- side in the life of the mind—are legitimate par- tants or interaction goals. We know that much of early sociological as legitimate social interactants.

The life of the whereas for men it was linked to instrumental mind was, and still is, viewed as inaccessible and pursuits. Such issues demand our attention and beckon Consider, for example, the earlier reported empirical investigation. We must be curious, for ex- our analysis of social interaction? We gain the ample, about how shared goals and understand- potential to scrutinize important exchanges that ings are reached in such situations.

Further, we traditional analytic frames block from view. Hu- must explore how or if interactions between the man interactions with animals, deities, the dead, embodied and the disembodied alter support and other developing objects have occurred systems or coping mechanisms. Finally, we must throughout history in cultures worldwide. Only then can our alive. These literatures include actor-network theory, interactionist theory, temporality theory, and theories of technological change.

Social scientists of earlier eras showed little Annu. But social scientists are now asking questions about how individuals envision and interpret nonhumans in interactive settings. Thus, nonhumans deserve a more central place in our analytic frame. Researchers should reconsider the role of mind in social interaction: We can effectively draw nonhumans into our analytic frame by acknowledging the variable states of mind automatic versus deliberate cognition that can accompany social interaction and use such variability to distinguish levels of participation.

Such issues demand our attention and beckon empirical investigation. Ruane for their helpful comments on various drafts and presentations of this article. The de-scription of technical objects. W Bijker, J Law, pp. Philadelphia, PA: Temple Univ. Press Allis S. Boston Globe, Feb. The role of design characteristics in shaping perceptions of Annu. My virtual summer job. Wall Street Journal, May Industry statistics and trends. The Social Life of Things. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Regarding Animals. Press Barrett JL. Why Would Anyone Believe in God?

Conceptualizing a nonnatural entity: anthropomorphism in God concepts. How does God answer back? Poetics 36 5—6 —92 Bendiksen R, Fulton R. Death and the child: an anterospective test of the childhood bereavement and later behavior disorder hypothesis. Omega 6 1 —59 Berger P, Luckmann T. The Social Construction of Reality. Understanding the enduring power of this genetic imaginary and its consequences remains a key task for the social sciences, one which treats ongoing genetic expectations and predictions in a sceptical yet open way.

Within the sociology of health and illness, the development and implications of contemporary genetics have been a major focus for both debate and research for the past 25 years Conrad and Gabe , Tutton and Hallowell , and continue to be an important area of study. This had led to the creation of new research programmes, journals, conferences, and institutes and has also stimulated the development of a series of important concepts and theoretical frameworks. One of the most influential of these has been Abby Lippman's geneticisation thesis.

Yet to date, the contribution of genomics to transforming routine healthcare is relatively modest, especially when viewed against past expectations. What then are we to make of this situation and to what extent has society been geneticised? In this review article we provide an overview of this important field and take stock of the now considerable literature on geneticisation. In particular, we consider where the concept now stands both empirically and theoretically, and reflect on the future of this topic.

We argue that relatively little of what Lippman anticipated has come to pass, and suggest that the past twenty five years have seen both shifts in scientific understandings of disease and in social scientific understandings of the processes of sociotechnical change, both of which have come to be characterised in more complex ways. We conclude that while the specific expectations embedded in the geneticisation thesis have not been realised, a powerful genetic imaginary persists.

There is a place for continued scholarship on the origins and consequences of this genetic imaginary which remains open yet sceptical about the futures imagined. Abby Lippman first introduced the concept of geneticisation in two key papers Lippman , In several subsequent papers, Lippman reiterated and further developed her arguments about geneticisation see for example Lippman , She defined geneticisation as:. An ongoing process by which differences between individuals are reduced to their DNA codes, with most disorders, behaviours and psychological variations defined, at least in part, as genetic in origin.

It refers as well to the process by which interventions employing genetic technologies are adopted to manage problems of health. Through this process, human biology is incorrectly equated with human genetics, implying that the latter acts alone to make us each the organism she or he is. Lippman : The central tenets of Lippman's thesis can be summarised as follows: Genetics is becoming the dominant discourse — both professional and popular mass media discourses about health and disease are increasingly drawing on genetics.

Indeed, this is becoming the dominant discourse about health and disease Lippman : Genetic discourses are reductionist and deterministic — they suggest that models of health and disease can be reduced to a set of biological components and that, in the end, genes determine health. Society is becoming stratified along genetic lines — geneticisation redefines what are to be understood as significant differences between people, establishing hierarchies among people on the basis of differences in their DNA. Geneticisation affects our healthcare practices and our values and attitudes — it conditions how health problems are defined, viewed and managed.

It privatises and individualises health risks and responsibility and focuses attention on biological rather than social conditions, potentially increasing social inequalities and leading to victim blaming. It further leads to the increased use of genetic technologies in health care, displacing other ways of categorising and managing illness.

Lippman's critique combined a constructionist understanding of health and illness and a commitment to health activism. Her aim was both to highlight the social and cultural assumptions that underpin genetic ways of categorising and responding to health problems, and to prioritise alternative responses that foreground the social and structural determinants of health.

In this way, the geneticisation thesis was part of a much wider debate about the construction and management of health and illness. In particular, Lippman's reference to the individualising and privatising of health risks and responsibilities echoes critiques of the wider field of health prevention Petersen and Lupton , suggesting that her arguments have broader relevance beyond the specificities of genetics and genomics. At the same time, Lippman's original papers were partly intended to counteract the hyperbole surrounding the Human Genome Project HGP and in particular, her work contributed to a wider critique or unease about the growing prominence of genetic discourses and practices around this time.

In addition, the concept has also travelled, been adopted and reinterpreted in the context of other disciplinary traditions, most notably philosophy. A key task of this review is therefore to map the development of the geneticisation concept and examine its multiple meanings. We also searched for references citing Lippman or The authors then went through all the results to identify references that employed the concept of geneticisation and to consider, in particular, those in which this provided a central analytic theme.

Inclusion was derived through concensus following a collective process of reading and discussion. We supplemented these results with additional references, particularly books, drawing on both Google Scholar and our own knowledge in this field. Papers and books which only noted geneticisation in passing or had a primary focus elsewhere were excluded.

For purely practical reasons of scale and scope, we have not included these studies and have in general used the inclusion criteria outlined above. However, in a small number of cases where such papers are highly pertinent to the arguments they have been referenced. So to be clear about the scope and limits of this review, we do not set out to undertake a comprehensive sociology of the new genetics, and our review excludes much interesting scholarship and further concepts in this field.

Instead, its focus is on a circumscribed body of work that elaborates, analyses, and critique's Lippman's geneticisation thesis. Geneticisation, as Lippman acknowledges, can be seen as being based on the idea of medicalisation, and discussions of geneticisation have followed a similar trajectory along two main lines. The first has contested the analytical and empirical basis of the concept and the second has broadened the range of actors implicated in the phenomenon of geneticisation.

These debates set out an empirical agenda for the social sciences and help to circumscribe some key considerations, which have been taken up to differing degrees in the scholarship we consider in the rest of this paper. One of the scholars most active in this debate has been Adam Hedgecoe. His critique of geneticisation Hedgecoe, , represents a call for empirical research rather than philosophically based bioethical analysis.

He criticises the use of geneticisation in bioethical analyses, which, he argues, treat geneticisation as an inherently critical concept, where the implementation of genetic technologies can only be seen as negative. Having set out this agenda, Hedgecoe's own work looks at developments in the definitions and management of a number of conditions schizophrenia, diabetes, cystic fibrosis, etc. We note, however, Kerr's thoroughgoing critique of Hedgecoe's methods and analytical focus on geneticisation, which she argues erroneously foregrounds genetic reductionism at the expense of ambiguity and uncertainty.

Hoedemaekers and ten Have have also taken issue with Hedgecoe. In contrast to the emphasis on geneticisation as an empirical phenomenon, they regard geneticisation, like medicalisation, as a heuristic tool that helps bring different moral perspectives into view. Novas and Rose Novas and Rose , , Rose argue that geneticisation ultimately implies the subjection and control of passive individuals and groups.

While these expectations align with those of geneticisation, Conrad argues that these will be driven by the interests of biotechnology companies rather than clinicians, thereby introducing a further set of actors with a stake in geneticisation.

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Weiner and Martin have suggested that the notion of geneticisation may partly be seen as a form of boundary work Gieryn undertaken by social scientists as a means to reinforce their own authority, expertise and resource claims in the area of health and illness. This view recognises that there may be a number of different professional groups with a stake in any particular field of medicine and sees boundary work as part of normal disciplinary practices.

Given the breadth of the notion of geneticisation we organise our analysis around three overarching areas which have formed both the main topics of research and represent key areas of social life that might be transformed by new genetic knowledge: scientific discourse and practice; clinical discourse and practice; and popular culture and lay discourses and practices. In adopting this approach we are not making a distinction between conceptual and empirical work, but focus instead on how the concept of geneticisation has been constructed in these different fields.

Work in this category can be divided into three types: first, there are articles of a philosophical nature that focus on demonstrating that genetic models of disease are erroneous, and suggest that ethical and social analysts have reinforced these mistakes. Second, there are a number of papers with an empirical focus which explore the rhetorical and practical work of scientists when attributing genetic causes to diseases or characteristics.

In the first group, the philosopher Gannett proposes that there are no wholly objective criteria for attributing cause and that the designation of a disease or susceptibility as genetic always involves a pragmatic element. Echoing Lippman's constructivist view, she suggests that geneticisation is not the result of increased theoretical knowledge.

Chaufan suggests that scholars engaged with geneticisation have focused on the degree of emphasis on genetic variation and the benefits and disbenefits of such information, but have largely failed to question the feasibility of identifying such variation in the first place, a view she undermines drawing on methodological arguments. Again echoing Lippman, Chaufan posits that the quest to illuminate differential vulnerability to common diseases may be at best redundant and at worst harmful in diverting resources from factors known to produce health irrespective of genome.

A second group of scholars look at how such genetic models concerning a range of conditions are accomplished in practice. Subsequent studies based on ethnographies and textual analyses have found parallels with Hedgecoe's work, while tending to stress complexity. For example Hall , and Weiner and Martin also find discourses of enlightened geneticisation, yet Hall reports in the case of hypertension the strategic enrolment by geneticists of essentialism and uncertainty at different points in the funding cycle.

They argue that the narrative of complexity contributes to the everyday work of managing uncertainty.

Introduction to Sociology/Print version

Navon and Eyal's work on genomics research into autism again finds complexity rather than reductionism. Here genetic mutations act as boundary objects that can accommodate different understandings of aetiology while facilitating cooperation and exchange. Lippman's critique combined a constructionist understanding of health and illness and a commitment to health activism. Her aim was both to highlight the social and cultural assumptions that underpin genetic ways of categorising and responding to health problems, and to prioritise alternative responses that foreground the social and structural determinants of health.

In this way, the geneticisation thesis was part of a much wider debate about the construction and management of health and illness. In particular, Lippman's reference to the individualising and privatising of health risks and responsibilities echoes critiques of the wider field of health prevention Petersen and Lupton , suggesting that her arguments have broader relevance beyond the specificities of genetics and genomics.

At the same time, Lippman's original papers were partly intended to counteract the hyperbole surrounding the Human Genome Project HGP and in particular, her work contributed to a wider critique or unease about the growing prominence of genetic discourses and practices around this time. In addition, the concept has also travelled, been adopted and reinterpreted in the context of other disciplinary traditions, most notably philosophy.

A key task of this review is therefore to map the development of the geneticisation concept and examine its multiple meanings. We also searched for references citing Lippman or The authors then went through all the results to identify references that employed the concept of geneticisation and to consider, in particular, those in which this provided a central analytic theme.

Inclusion was derived through concensus following a collective process of reading and discussion. We supplemented these results with additional references, particularly books, drawing on both Google Scholar and our own knowledge in this field. Papers and books which only noted geneticisation in passing or had a primary focus elsewhere were excluded. For purely practical reasons of scale and scope, we have not included these studies and have in general used the inclusion criteria outlined above.

However, in a small number of cases where such papers are highly pertinent to the arguments they have been referenced. So to be clear about the scope and limits of this review, we do not set out to undertake a comprehensive sociology of the new genetics, and our review excludes much interesting scholarship and further concepts in this field. Instead, its focus is on a circumscribed body of work that elaborates, analyses, and critique's Lippman's geneticisation thesis.

Geneticisation, as Lippman acknowledges, can be seen as being based on the idea of medicalisation, and discussions of geneticisation have followed a similar trajectory along two main lines. The first has contested the analytical and empirical basis of the concept and the second has broadened the range of actors implicated in the phenomenon of geneticisation.

These debates set out an empirical agenda for the social sciences and help to circumscribe some key considerations, which have been taken up to differing degrees in the scholarship we consider in the rest of this paper. One of the scholars most active in this debate has been Adam Hedgecoe. His critique of geneticisation Hedgecoe, , represents a call for empirical research rather than philosophically based bioethical analysis. He criticises the use of geneticisation in bioethical analyses, which, he argues, treat geneticisation as an inherently critical concept, where the implementation of genetic technologies can only be seen as negative.

Having set out this agenda, Hedgecoe's own work looks at developments in the definitions and management of a number of conditions schizophrenia, diabetes, cystic fibrosis, etc. We note, however, Kerr's thoroughgoing critique of Hedgecoe's methods and analytical focus on geneticisation, which she argues erroneously foregrounds genetic reductionism at the expense of ambiguity and uncertainty. Hoedemaekers and ten Have have also taken issue with Hedgecoe. In contrast to the emphasis on geneticisation as an empirical phenomenon, they regard geneticisation, like medicalisation, as a heuristic tool that helps bring different moral perspectives into view.

Novas and Rose Novas and Rose , , Rose argue that geneticisation ultimately implies the subjection and control of passive individuals and groups. While these expectations align with those of geneticisation, Conrad argues that these will be driven by the interests of biotechnology companies rather than clinicians, thereby introducing a further set of actors with a stake in geneticisation. Weiner and Martin have suggested that the notion of geneticisation may partly be seen as a form of boundary work Gieryn undertaken by social scientists as a means to reinforce their own authority, expertise and resource claims in the area of health and illness.

This view recognises that there may be a number of different professional groups with a stake in any particular field of medicine and sees boundary work as part of normal disciplinary practices. Given the breadth of the notion of geneticisation we organise our analysis around three overarching areas which have formed both the main topics of research and represent key areas of social life that might be transformed by new genetic knowledge: scientific discourse and practice; clinical discourse and practice; and popular culture and lay discourses and practices.


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  4. In adopting this approach we are not making a distinction between conceptual and empirical work, but focus instead on how the concept of geneticisation has been constructed in these different fields. Work in this category can be divided into three types: first, there are articles of a philosophical nature that focus on demonstrating that genetic models of disease are erroneous, and suggest that ethical and social analysts have reinforced these mistakes.

    Second, there are a number of papers with an empirical focus which explore the rhetorical and practical work of scientists when attributing genetic causes to diseases or characteristics. In the first group, the philosopher Gannett proposes that there are no wholly objective criteria for attributing cause and that the designation of a disease or susceptibility as genetic always involves a pragmatic element. Echoing Lippman's constructivist view, she suggests that geneticisation is not the result of increased theoretical knowledge. Chaufan suggests that scholars engaged with geneticisation have focused on the degree of emphasis on genetic variation and the benefits and disbenefits of such information, but have largely failed to question the feasibility of identifying such variation in the first place, a view she undermines drawing on methodological arguments.

    Again echoing Lippman, Chaufan posits that the quest to illuminate differential vulnerability to common diseases may be at best redundant and at worst harmful in diverting resources from factors known to produce health irrespective of genome. A second group of scholars look at how such genetic models concerning a range of conditions are accomplished in practice. Subsequent studies based on ethnographies and textual analyses have found parallels with Hedgecoe's work, while tending to stress complexity. For example Hall , and Weiner and Martin also find discourses of enlightened geneticisation, yet Hall reports in the case of hypertension the strategic enrolment by geneticists of essentialism and uncertainty at different points in the funding cycle.

    They argue that the narrative of complexity contributes to the everyday work of managing uncertainty. Navon and Eyal's work on genomics research into autism again finds complexity rather than reductionism. Here genetic mutations act as boundary objects that can accommodate different understandings of aetiology while facilitating cooperation and exchange. These studies, then, demonstrate the rhetorical role of complexity in the work of geneticists, as well as the continued complexity and heterogeneity of disease models across different fields of biomedical science. One area of discussion about geneticisation unanticipated by Lippman concerns race.

    There has been a major debate about the extent to which notions of race are being reconstructed or reinscribed along genetic lines in scientific discourse through the increasing use of DNA technologies Duster , Skinner Although the human genome project was meant to herald the end to any biological notions of race, geneticists and biologists have actually become greatly interested in race and racial differences, especially in the US Kahn , Pollock Finally, we consider work that more broadly explores shifting narratives and expectations within the field of genetics.

    Here we draw on both social science scholarship and scientific commentary, that, while not referencing geneticisation, proves illuminating. The dominant paradigm within genetics historically attributed inherited factors a major role in the aetiology of common complex conditions. In contrast, major successes are deemed to have come from the identification of somatic i.

    At the same time, investment in new techniques continue, leading to new iterations of expectations. Drawing across the micro studies and wider surveys we have reviewed, we see a changing focus of scientific interest and social science attention to more complex and dynamic accounts of disease than anticipated by the geneticisation thesis. We also see developments unanticipated by Lippman, including debates about the geneticisation of race, and the therapeutic use of genomic techniques in conditions unrelated to inherited traits. The rise of this genomic paradigm over the last 15 years, with its emphasis on complexity and interaction, has therefore come to eclipse the sometimes crude genetic determinism that underpinned Lippman's original thesis.

    Important changes in scientific concepts, discourses and practices are therefore reflected in the social science literature. However, despite the move to more complex models of the role of genetic factors in disease aetiology, the underlying expectations about the power of genetics and genomics to transform biomedicine remains intact in some quarters, despite critical reflection to the contrary.

    Doubts about the impact of genetics in the clinic are reinforced in detailed studies in clinical settings. As noted above in relation to CF, there may be dissonance between, scientific and clinical ways of categorising the condition, and genetic testing has not proven decisive for diagnosis in clinical practice Hedgecoe, , Kerr, Similar conclusions have been drawn in the area of common conditions. In a further example, Hall found that health care professionals at a coronary care unit reported that they were reluctant to mention genetics in patient consultations and that they were likely to foreground lifestyle issues for fear of inducing fatalism.

    This hints at a possible distinction between the diagnosis and management of existing conditions and prenatal screening practices. This work is important in providing detailed empirical investigation that links clinical practices and their regulation with diciplinary differences as well as local cultural and economic influences. Contrary to the expectations of the geneticisation thesis, these studies highlight the complex relationship between bioscientific and clinical understandings of disease, the relatively circumscribed influence of geneticists, the diversity of clinical practices, as well as the wider influences on such practices.

    Hedgecoe's own work and the studies discussed here suggest this view is largely unfounded and underscore the limitations of the widely held assumption that genetics and genomics will transform medicine. These studies demonstrate that medical practice is much more than just the application of scientific knowledge. In examining the potential cultural impact of the new genetics some have focused on the nature and power of the metaphors used in their explanation e.

    Franklin writes about the Hollywood film Jurassic Park which shows the power of genetic science to recreate life through the new practices of the genomic biosciences, as further demonstrated by the media attention given to the cloning of Dolly the Sheep.